Indo-Pacific Defense Strategy Assessment of Trump 2.0
By: Jackson Craig Scott and Krista E. Wiegand
- Officials in the first Trump administration shared a relatively consistent foreign policy identity compared to Trump 2.0, which houses a mix of Primacists, Prioritizers, and Restrainers.
- However, so far U.S. strategy in the Indo-Pacific region is continuing along the same general trajectory that characterized both Trump 1.0 and the Biden administration – an interesting rejection of the isolationism that has arisen among some Trump loyalists.
- Trump’s trade war, while seemingly an economic issue, is directly affecting the Pentagon’s security mission in the Indo-Pacific. Tariffs are being imposed on partners, allies, and enemies alike, and risk pushing countries toward China.
Donald Trump ran on a campaign to end forever wars and with heavy skepticism of allies and partners. After six months in office, a clearer defense policy in the Indo-Pacific region is emerging from the White House and Pentagon. Donald Trump’s first administration had a consistent foreign policy identity. While there was a high rate of turnover, the identity remained the same: conservative internationalists whose philosophies stemmed from Reagan-era Republicans. Key officials in the first Trump administration such as Mike Pence, Jim Mattis, H. R. McMaster, John Bolton, Nikki Haley, Mike Pompeo, and Mark Esper had clear and consistent foreign policy beliefs among them.
Foreign policy priorities have shifted in the current Trump administration, and decisions and strategies are much more variable. Loyalists have pushed isolationism, while reluctant Trump supporters and a few cabinet-level leaders still adhere to Reagan’s conservative internationalism. Trump’s second administration is a peculiar mix of Primacists, Prioritizers, and Restrainers (or Isolationists). Each is attempting to have influence over the direction of US defense policies. For example, JD Vance is often seen as a Restrainer, advocating reduced military involvement to focus resources on domestic goals. Under Secretary for Defense Elbridge Colby is viewed as a Prioritizer, advocating for national security efforts that only strengthen the US position against rising powers. Marco Rubio has traditionally been seen as a Primacist, advocating proactive threat management, global engagement, and US leadership in world affairs. Finally, there are cabinet officials like Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth and Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard who have been met with skepticism by Reaganites. This creates uncertainty among scholars, commentators, allies, and enemies alike about which direction the Trump administration will take for the remainder of the administration.
While it might be challenging to predict consistency with Trump’s Indo-Pacific defense strategy, examining the views of some of his key advisors is useful to envisage the direction of this strategy. Marco Rubio has a history of being a China hawk and one of his first priorities as Secretary of State was to begin to eliminate Chinese influence from Latin America, a place long neglected by the Department of State. A new Monroe Doctrine has taken shape for the Trump administration. However, instead of European colonial powers, the target is malign Chinese economic influence in the region. Elbridge Colby, who comes across as a Prioritizer, is a somewhat controversial figure whose foreign and defense policy is most akin to Henry Kissinger, a realist to the core. He believes China is the first and foremost adversary of the US and that anything that takes away resources from the China threat is a mistake. Not an isolationist, Colby is an intense pragmatist who brings a sobering reality to the Pentagon, which has been overstretched for years. The US military cannot fight a three-theater war (Europe, Middle East, and Asia), and most likely cannot fight a full scale two-theater war. Yet, he frustrates the Primacists who believe the US has the resources to deter Russia, Iran, North Korea, China, terrorism, and secure the southern border all at the same time. Additionally, Colby has also called for an increase in defense spending from all US allies and partners, many of whom are reluctant to do so.
Trump has not released his Indo-Pacific Security Strategy, but Secretary of Defense Hegseth’s speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue can certainly be described as bellicose toward China. Hegseth also made note of the fact that China did not send its defense minister: “We share your vision of peace and stability, of prosperity and security…And we are here to stay…And as a matter of fact, we are here this morning, and somebody else isn’t.” Hegseth reassured allies and partners that they would not be marginalized and coerced by China while also warning that China’s actions are alarming and that the US cannot ignore them.
Importantly, Hegseth asserted that China will not invade Taiwan under Trump’s presidency, adding that if deterrence fails and if directed by Trump, “we are prepared to do what the Department of Defense does best – fight and win – decisively.” This last point is perhaps the most important part of the entire speech. The Trump administration is continuing the Biden administration’s policy of being significantly clearer about the Taiwan question compared to previous administrations. While still official policy, it would not be impossible for a US government in the near future to shift away from strategic ambiguity on the Taiwan issue due to growing bipartisan consensus about China.
Early Successes
There are several policy areas in which Trump could succeed. Foreign leaders have been worried about the future of their partnership with the US because of Trump’s skepticism of alliances and partners. While Trump has made inflammatory remarks toward NATO and Ukraine, his focus on Asia in his first administration and already in his second administration should give some reassurance. Two key events signal the Trump administration’s commitment to the Indo-Pacific region. Prime Minister Ishiba Shigeru was only the second foreign leader to visit the White House in early February 2025, just two weeks after Trump’s inauguration. During the visit, the US affirmed its strong defense commitment to Japan via all its military capabilities, including US nuclear capabilities. Furthermore, Trump and Ishiba reaffirmed that Article V of the US-Japan defense treaty does apply to the Senkaku Islands, which are disputed between Japan and China. Additionally, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth’s first visit to the Indo-Pacific was in March of 2025. There he made stops in Hawai’i, Guam, the Philippines, and Japan. In the Philippines he and the Filippino Secretary of National Defense “reaffirmed that the [Mutual Defense Treaty] extends to armed attacks against either country’s armed forces, aircraft, and public vessels – including those of their coast guards – anywhere in the South China Sea.” In Japan he “underscore[d] the United States’ commitment to the defense of Japan.”
As part of Hegseth’s first Indo-Pacific tour, he recommitted to changing US Forces Japan from an administrative command to a combined operational command. This policy started during the Biden administration and there were some who had worried that the Trump administration would reverse it. However, Hegseth’s statements clarified that Trump would not change the policy. Additionally, the US and Japan will assist each other through defense industrial base initiatives. Hegseth reaffirmed to the Philippines that the US will send additional military resources to their military, including the Navy-Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System (NMESIS). This was also announced under Biden and continued under Trump. The two countries will also pursue defense industrial cooperation.
The Trump administration has also reassured US allies and partners through joint military training in the INDOPACOM area of responsibility. In February and March this year, the US and Thailand conducted the Joint Exercise Cobra Gold, followed in April with the US-India joint exercise Tiger Triumph which incorporated satellite and unmanned technologies for the first time. In May, the US concluded the Balikatan exercises with the Philippines, Pacific Griffin was held near Guam with Singapore in June, and Resolute Force Pacific was held with partners and allies in July. In the same month, the US military and 19 countries conducted Talisman Sabre with record participation, involving over 30,000 service members involved in land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace operations.
The future of the Trump administration’s Indo-Pacific defense strategy will depend on several policy areas outside of defense, particularly trade deals negotiated with Indo-Pacific allies and partners. However, despite the distaste of Trump for Biden’s administration, the Trump administration is continuing Biden’s defense policies of creating a latticework of defense alliances and partnerships throughout the region. This bipartisan approach shows a sustainable future for US defense policies in the region, and an interesting but key rejection of isolationism that has arisen amongst some of the Trump loyalists.
Even in a highly polarized time in the US, there is a fairly clear and consistent strategy from the government about Indo-Pacific security, regardless of which party is in power. Biden’s Indo-Pacific security policies were closely aligned to those of Trump’s first administration, and Trump’s second administration has so far continued the same trajectory.
Early Challenges
Trump has clearly signaled that economics is his administration’s first international relations priority by starting a trade war with the entire world, not discriminating between partners, allies, and enemies. Unsurprisingly, this approach to trade has caused friction between the US and allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific. While seemingly separate issues, the tariffs and subsequent trade negotiations have and will continue to directly affect the Pentagon’s security mission.
Relatedly, most of the ASEAN countries, besides the Philippines, are hedging between China and the US. Putting large tariffs on those countries is helping to move these countries closer toward China. ASEAN countries are seeking not just military aid from the US, but economic relations too. Tariffs in respect to the US-China competition are a regressive policy that will push countries in the region toward China and away from US policy priorities in the region
Additionally, the Trump administration needs to be careful when calling for Asian allies to increase defense spending, which has led to allies’ concerns about US defense reliability and even fears of US abandonment in a crisis. Recently, Japan cancelled its 2+2 summit after the US demanded an increase in defense spending. The original request was 3% of GDP, but the US raised the request to 3.5%. The White House might be wise to consider whether it is more important for allies to increase defense spending or whether the alliance is strong and reliable. While these strategies are not mutually exclusive, demands on allies in the region in both defense spending and trade can have long term consequences that could involve unwillingness to partner with the US in an Indo-Pacific war.
The current review of the AUKUS security pact by Elbridge Colby is standard procedure for a new administration since it is such a large agreement. However, the depth and expected length of the review is leading Australia to question US economic and security commitment, as well as debates about Australia’s future as a major player in Indo-Pacific security.
Finally, ending the large amounts of foreign aid to Indo-Pacific countries erodes US influence and increases Chinese influence. It also hurts US reputation and legitimacy abroad. While foreign aid is not seen as an element of national security, whatever foreign aid the US stops is foreign aid that China will begin.
The Trump administration’s defense policy has been all over the place, literally and figuratively, but much less so in the Indo-Pacific region, where there is strong consistency of national interests, priorities, and strategies from the first Trump administration, throughout Biden’s administration, and now in Trump’s second term. While there are questions about reliability of US defense of allies, we should expect to see more security commitment to the Indo-Pacific than to any other region of the world, and a growing stand against China.
Jackson Craig Scott is a recent graduate of the Master of Public Policy program at the Baker School of Public Policy at the University of Tennessee, Knoxville. Krista Wiegand is Director of the Center for National Security and Foreign Affairs and professor at the Baker School.